Uma análise sobre a lei de improbidade administrativa: a mudança para a Lei n° 14.230/21 e o reflexo na punibilidade dos agentes públicos

Abstract

The present work is intended for the theoretical analysis that involves the Law of Administrative Improbity as a whole, shaping its purpose with regard to the fight against corruption, as well as the context in which this legal provision emerged in the legal system, as a mechanism to ensure that public managers are punished to the detriment of attitudes that violate the public interest and the guidelines that permeate public administration in its broadest sense, respecting its principles. In this way, with these breaches of values, it is necessary to punish those responsible for these acts, this law being the specific mechanism to guarantee greater obedience to this punishment. In 2021, this device, which had not been altered since 1992, underwent changes that made the punishments more volatile and less rigid, allowing that in the legal scenario, there was less punishment for these agents, that is, there are fewer legal hypotheses that can be imputed to a subject an act of impropriety. Thus, the hypothetical-deductive method will be used to analyze legal articles, laws, jurisprudence and bibliographies in general, seeking to understand what led the law to be applied in this way and what is the practical impact that the legislative legislation gave rise to this lower punishment in to the detriment of dishonest acts committed by public agents and punishable by law.