Processo eletrônico: avanço ou negação do princípio do acesso à justiça?

Abstract

This paper consists on the result of a theoretical character research which sought to demonstrate that the electronic process, although shown as an advance, is actually denying one of the most primeval civil legal process law principles, which is included on the Lex Major, the principle of access to justice. According to our understanding, the introduction of the electronic process the way it’s been done by the courts of justice, imposed by the National Justice Counsel through resolution 185, from December 18, 2013, without the necessary infrastructure to the application by the system operators (lawyers, judges and officials) is overshadowing the right to access to justice. Following the comprehension of how the process works and how the principle of access to justice blend itself in it, we are able to percieve the barrier the electronic process imposes. Under this perspective, we question: Is it possible to access justice in a fair manner through the introduction of the electronic process? Is the electronic process in fact an advance? Besides, how does the right of the disabled bodies individuals in accessing the system stand? Therein, it is defended the hypothesis of the electronic process as a way of access to justice in a fair manner is being a disavowal, therefore, the way it’s been introduced is diminishing some rights from the difficulty of access to the electronic system, be it inexperience with computers, or the special needs some may present. As a consequence of this wrong procedure, it is understood that the electronic process is a denial of the principle of access to justice.